GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW

VOLUME 51

2022

NUMBER 1

ARTICLES
ATTRIBUTING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
CRIME OF AGGRESSION
Nikola R. Hajdin*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................2
II. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS ..............................................................................7
III. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ATTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW .......................... 14
IV. ATTRIBUTING WRONGFULNESS OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION ............. 20
V. ATTRIBUTING CULPABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION .................. 25
A. Conduct ............................................................................................ 26
B. Consequence ................................................................................... 26
C. Circumstances ................................................................................ 29
VI. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................... 35

* Fellow at the Faculty of Law and Christ Church, Oxford University, Oxford, U.K.
Senior Fellow at the Stockholm Centre for International Law and Justice. I thank Aldin
Ljuca, Thomas Weigend, and Roger Clark for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Usual caveats apply. Special thanks go to my friend and colleague, Mark Klamberg, without whose generous support this and many other projects would never come to realization.

1

GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.

2

[Vol. 51:1

Abstract
To hold a person criminally responsible, the prosecution must prove that his
conduct violated (without justification) a prohibitory norm of the criminal code
and that he is culpable for such wrongdoing. In international criminal law,
wrongfulness and culpability are assessed through the prisms of material (actus
reus) and mental (mens rea) elements, respectively. Also called “objective attribution,” ascribing wrongfulness requires a causal link between individual conduct
and criminal consequences. Attributing culpability, or “subjective attribution,”
on the other hand, consists of establishing mental links between the perpetrator
and the occurrence he has caused and the situation in which such an event took
place. This Article sets out the normative foundation for the attribution of criminal
responsibility for aggression based on the theory of actus reus that I proposed in
my previous scholarship. Two findings are paramount. First, to incur wrongfulness, the perpetrator need not necessarily be accountable for an entire act of aggression. It suffices if the prosecution proves that he caused a single instance of
the use of armed force that is part of broader hostilities which, taken as a whole,
amount to the overarching state conduct element, i.e., an act of aggression that
manifestly violates the Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter). Second, as
a consequence of the first proposition, the individual is culpable if he is mindful
of his state leadership position and intends the use of armed force against another
state or is aware that such occurrence will result from his conduct, while being
cognizant of the factual circumstances allowing for such action to constitute in
and of itself or contribute to an overarching act of aggression that manifestly
violates the U.N. Charter.

I. INTRODUCTION
The beginning of 2022 will be remembered by unfortunate events in
Ukraine qualified as an aggressive war by Russia.1 The open military invasion
of Ukraine presents an enormous challenge to preserving the current international legal order and calls for responsibility for the crime of aggression.2 The
crime of aggression is part of what we refer to as international law stricto
sensu, alongside war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.3 These
1

G.A. Res. ES-11/1 (Mar. 18, 2022).
Statement Calling for the Creation of a Special Tribunal for the Punishment of the
Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine, JUSTICE FOR UKRAINE (Mar. 4, 2022), https://justicefor-ukraine.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Combined-Statement-and-DeclarationEnglish.pdf.
3 In a stricto sensu meaning, international criminal law constitutes individual criminal
responsibility directly under the norms of international law. See Claus Kreß, International
Criminal Law, in 5 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 717, 719
(2009). “Core crimes” are part of the body of international criminal law stricto sensu; that
is, there is direct criminal responsibility under international law in the event of breach of
those norms.
2
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are the four core crimes that are under the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (ICC),4 and they are recognized as universally wrong on the
international plane.5 Unlike the other three crimes, which have been fully operational at the ICC since 2002, the definition for the crime of aggression was
adopted only at the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in Kampala in 2010.6 The reasons for the delay in
international criminalization, which I discuss elsewhere,7 were chiefly political. Nonetheless, jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is now activated at
the ICC.8
The crime of aggression was first codified in the aftermath of World War
II (WWII) in the London Charter, which provided the legal basis for first international trial for aggression.9 Article 6(a) of the London Charter defined
the crime of aggression under the label “[c]rimes against peace.”10 This provision marked the beginning of the current era in which individual criminal
responsibility for aggression is part of customary international law.11 Despite
the post-WWII enthusiasm, little progress has been made in reaching internationally agreed-upon definition of the crime of aggression prior to the late
1990’s negotiations preceding the adoption of the Rome Statute.12 At the end
of negotiations, the crime of aggression was included in the jurisdiction of the
4

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICCSt.].
5 See TOM DANNENBAUM, THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, HUMANITY, AND THE SOLDIER
20 (2018).
6 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis & n.3. Koh and Buchwald identified a number of
issues that arose after the Kampala Review Conference pertaining to the understanding of
different components of the definition of the crime of aggression. See Harold Hongju Koh
& Todd F. Buchwald, The Crime of Aggression: The United States Perspective, 109 AM.
J. INT’L L. 257 (2015).
7 See NIKOLA R. HAJDIN, UNDERSTANDING AGGRESSION: LEGAL STATUS AND
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE THE 2010 KAMPALA CONFERENCE 9 (2015).
8 Assembly of States Parties [ASP], ICC-ASP/16/Res.5, Activation of the Jurisdiction
of the Court over the Crime of Aggression.
9 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59. Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter].
10 Id. at art. 6(a).
11 R v. Jones [2006] UKHL 16, [12], [19] (Lord Bingham), [44], [59] (Lord Hoffmann),
[96] (Lord Rodger), [97] (Lord Carswell), [99] (Lord Mance) (UK); Claus Kreß & Leonie
von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 1179, 1182 (2010); Bing Jia, The Crime of Aggression as Custom and the Mechanisms for Determining Acts of Aggression, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 569, 571 (2015). But see
Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 71, 74
(2010).
12 Claus Kreβ, Introduction: The Crime of Aggression and the International Legal Order, in 1 THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A COMMENTARY 5 (Claus Kreß & Stefan Barriga eds.,
2017).
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Rome Statute without, however, provision on the definition.13 Finally in Kampala 2010, Resolution 6 of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute14 laid
down the definition,15 conditions for jurisdiction,16 and the new leadership
clause.17
The Rome Statute defines the crime of aggression as follows:
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person
in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct
the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.18
The definition comprises individual conduct and state action elements. The
former is broken down into planning, preparation, initiation, and execution.
The latter—an act of aggression that manifestly violates the U.N. Charter—is
the reference point for individual criminal responsibility. Compared with the
other core crimes, the crime of aggression is peculiar in many ways.19 First,
the crime stipulates as a condition of criminal responsibility direct state action,
i.e., the state conduct element.20 While state involvement is typical of the other
core crimes,21 the crime of aggression is the only crime that explicitly requires
ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 5 & n.1 (“The [International Criminal] Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance
with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”).
14 Rev. Comm., ICC-RC/11/Res.6, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression.
15 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis.
16 Id. at arts. 15bis, 15ter.
17 Id. at arts. 8bis(1), 25(3bis).
18 Id. at art. 8bis(1).
19 See Astrid Reisinger Coracini & Pål Wrange, The Specificity of the Crime of Aggression, in THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 307.
20 See infra Part II.
21 International crimes are marked by an organizational context; they all have a unique,
systemic nature in that they are typically committed as part of a collective wrongdoing. See
1 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 85 (2013). Ambos refers to the
nature of core crimes as being “systemic” and gives as examples the extermination of Jews
during WWII, the Bosnian war in the 1990s, Rwanda’s genocide, and prison camps in
armed conflicts. All these crimes have a context in which they occur: for genocide, targeting a group with intent to destroy; for crimes against humanity, a systematic or widespread
attack; and for war crimes, the notion of armed attack. See id. Geneuss and Jessberger argue
that international crimes are ordinarily committed not as isolated events but in the context
of disturbed society. Julia Geneuss & Florian Jessberger, Introduction: The Need for a
Robust and Consistent Theory of International Punishment, in WHY PUNISH PERPETRATORS
13
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state involvement for criminal responsibility.22 Second, the crime of aggression is premised by the so-called “leadership clause,” as the attribution of
criminal responsibility is restricted to “person[s] in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a [s]tate.”23
Third, harm to individual human persons is not part of the definition.24 The
question of who the victims of a crime are (states or human beings), albeit an
important one,25 does not substantially further the main argument and therefore will not be discussed here. The first two points are pertinent to the main
subject of this Article—the system of attribution of individual responsibility.
To ascribe criminal responsibility, we must make objective and subjective
links between the individual and the offense.26 In international criminal law,
this is done through the prisms of material (actus reus) and mental (mens rea)
elements.27 The former is further broken down into conduct, consequences,
and circumstances, while the latter consists of intent and knowledge. In my
previous article, The Actus Reus of the Crime of Aggression28 (ARCA), I propose a new reading of the material (actus reus) elements of the crime of aggression. Accordingly, I make a conceptual distinction between the material
act of use of armed force and the state conduct element—both subsumed under the term “state action.”29 The former is classified as a consequence element, whereas the latter is to be understood as the contextual circumstance
that qualifies individual conduct as the crime of aggression. Discussion of the

MASS ATROCITIES? PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1, 2
(Florian Jessberger & Julia Geneuss eds., 2020).
22 While the international core crimes are ordinarily directed against a collective entity,
the crime of aggression occurs exclusively on the macro level. See Tom Dannenbaum, Why
Have We Criminalized Aggressive War?, 126 YALE L.J. 1242, 1246 (2017).
23 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis(1).
24 See id. In a strict legal-technical sense, the victim of the crime is a state. See Carsten
Stahn, The ‘End’, the ‘Beginning of the End’ or the ‘End of the Beginning’? Introducing
Debates and Voices on the Definition of ‘Aggression’, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 875, 876–77
(2010).
25 For a detailed treatment of this issue, see Erin Pobjie, Victims of the Crime of Aggression, in THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 816. Cf. Tom
Dannenbaum, The Criminalization of Aggression and Soldiers’ Rights, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L.
859, 860–64 (2018) (opining that the core criminal wrong of the crime of aggression is
essentially human violence and not the inter-state breach as many would think).
26 The attribution of criminal responsibility presupposes objective and subjective links
between the individual and the crime in question. See Thomas Weigend, Problems of Attribution in International Criminal Law: A German Perspective, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
253, 254 (2014).
27 Nikola R. Hajdin, Individual Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression 54 (2021)
(Ph.D. thesis, Stockholm University).
28 Nikola R. Hajdin, The Actus Reus of the Crime of Aggression, 34 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
489 (2021).
29 See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis(1).
OF
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consequence element was completely disregarded in both the preparatory
works and scholarship. The distinction between the consequence element and
the contextual circumstance, however, is crucial for the attribution of criminal
responsibility, as the prosecution must establish mental and material links between the accused and consequences, while only mental links apply to circumstances.30
This Article builds on the theory of actus reus set out in ARCA and provides the normative foundation for the attribution of criminal responsibility
for the crime of aggression. Drawing on the conceptual separation between
the use of armed force as a consequence element and the state conduct element
as the contextual circumstance, this Article argues that the perpetrator need
not necessarily be accountable for an act of aggression to incur wrongfulness
of aggression. It suffices if he caused the use of armed force that either in and
of itself constitutes the state conduct element or was part of a series of state
actions that together constitute the state conduct element. This Article also
revisits the scholarship on the mental (mens rea) elements of the crime of aggression and suggests a reading based on the theory of material (actus reus)
elements.
The analysis is structured as follows. Part II explains the kinds of state
conduct elements required for individual responsibility for the crime of aggression. Part III sets out the conditions for adjudicating criminal responsibility in international criminal law. In arguing criminal responsibility, the prosecution must prove that the accused committed the wrongdoing and that he is
culpable and therefore liable for punishment. Referring to ARCA, Part IV
briefly gives an account of the material elements and expounds on the attribution of wrongfulness in the crime of aggression. Part V examines the mental
elements of intent and knowledge required to hold an individual criminally
responsible for aggression. This Part revisits the scholarship on the mens rea
for the crime of aggression and offers a new interpretation based on the new
reading of the actus reus set out in ARCA. Part V’s main findings suggest that
the individual is culpable if he is mindful of his leadership position; intends
the use of armed force against another state or is aware that such occurrence
will result from his conduct; and is cognizant of the factual circumstances
allowing for such action to constitute in and of itself or contribute to an overarching act of aggression that manifestly violates the U.N. Charter. Part VI
provides a brief conclusion of the overall argument.

30

Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences, 142 CRIM. L.F. 291,
307 n.54 (2002).
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II. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
Throughout most of history, waging war was a legitimate means for states
to promote their political interests. The first international legal limitations addressed only the methods and means of waging war (jus in bello).31 With respect to the right to wage war itself (jus ad bellum), the first international regulation was adopted in 1928, when the General Treaty for Renunciation of
War as an Instrument of National Policy was signed in Paris.32 Also known as
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, this treaty served as a legal basis for convictions
regarding the crime of aggression during the Nuremberg era.33 The crime of
aggression was first codified in the aftermath of WWII. In 1945, the Allied
Powers adopted the London Charter as a legal basis for the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal,34 the first international trial for aggression.35 Article 6(a) of the London Charter defined the crime of aggression under the label
“crimes against peace” as “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war
of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”36 The International Military Tribunal for
the Far East had a similar provision,37 as did the Nuremberg Military Tribu-

31

See GERHARD WERLE & FLORIAN JESSBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 530 (Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2014).
32 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug,
27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
33 But see Thomas Weigend, “In General a Principle of Justice”: The Debate on the
“Crime Against Peace” in the Wake of the Nuremberg Judgment, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
41 (2012) (arguing that the Nuremberg judgment did not give a good argument for maintaining the principle nullum crimen sine lege with respect to convictions regarding the
crime of aggression).
34 London Charter, supra note 9.
35 ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 307 (3d ed. 2016).
36 London Charter, supra note 9, at art. 6(a).
37 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 5(a), Jan. 19, 1946,
1589 T.I.A.S. 21 (amended Apr. 26, 1946) [hereinafter Tokyo Charter] (“The following
acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which
there shall be individual responsibility: Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”).

8
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nals run by the occupying authority that later prosecuted perpetrators of aggression in the different zones of occupation.38 In the Rome Statute, the definition is enshrined in Article 8bis(1).39
In essence, the criminalization of aggression is an effort to deter illegal
inter-state violence, in line with the prohibition of the use of force in international law.40 The main legal basis for the prohibition of the use of force is
found in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which reads “[State members of the
U.N. Charter] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”41 It is noteworthy that the concept of “force” is broader than “war,”
which denotes “an especially serious form of the use of force.”42 To establish
the existence of the use of force, two criteria must be satisfied. The first is
objective and pertains to the level of intensity. The second is more subjective
and requires that a state intend to resort to force against another state in order
to compel her to act or to refrain from action.43
Depending on the level of intensity, the use of force in international law
may be classified as a mere use of force, armed attack, or act of aggression.
To date, the minimum intensity of violence that reaches the threshold of use

38 Only a couple of months after the Nuremberg Tribunal rendered its judgment, the
Allied Powers issued Law No. 10 authorizing the occupying authority in each of the zones
of occupation to establish tribunals to prosecute war criminals and other similar offenders
not addressed in the Nuremberg judgment. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of
Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity (Dec. 20,
1945), in 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 12 (1946). Article II(1)(a)
criminalizes aggression, id. (“Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: (a)
Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in
violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”).
39 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis(1).
40 The prohibition of the use of force is part of customary international law. Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 172–186 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Judgment]. For criticism of
the crime of aggression’s deterrent value, see Kevin Jon Heller, Who is Afraid of the Crime
of Aggression?, 19 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 999 (2021) (arguing that given the crime’s jurisdictional and substantive limitations, prosecutions before the ICC will be rare).
41 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. Article 2(4) prohibits the transboundary use of armed force,
including the use of force justified by different doctrines, such as reprisal and humanitarian
intervention. Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 42 (2002).
42 OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE
IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2010).
43 Id. at 67.
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of force remains unclear.44 According to the so-called de minimis approach,
small-scale territorial incursions by armed units with hostile intent would
amount to use of force.45 What is clear is that, unlike the threat of use of force,
the actual use of force (which is a requirement in the definition of the crime
of aggression) always implies an act of violence.46 That is, violence is built
into the notion of use of force. The term “violence” in international law denotes a deliberate exercise of force or intimidation by the exhibition of such
force by a state against another state.47 Consequently, while there must be an
actual physical effect, the use of force does not necessarily need to render
harm.48 An example is a military invasion with neither resistance nor casualties.49
A mere violation of the prohibition on use of force in Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter is an internationally wrongful act of a state that solely entails
state responsibility.50 An armed attack, on the other hand, invokes the right to
self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.51 There is no definition of “armed attack” in the U.N. Charter, and therefore, it must be sought in
customary international law.52 In Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice
44

CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 36–40 (4th ed. 2018).
See Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum:
Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded From UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 AM. J. INT’L
L. 159, 189 (2014).
46 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 88 (5th ed. 2011);
CARRIE MCDOUGALL, THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 65–66 (2013).
47 See violence, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 825 (2012); World Report on
Violence and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 5–7 (2002).
48 In this context, harm means death, injury, and damage or destruction of property.
But see Gray, supra note 44, at 34. Gray seems to conflate the terms physical harm and
violence. While the latter usually presupposes the former, violence can also occur without
any physical harm (exhibition of force).
49 Rodin gives two examples of what he coins “bloodless invasion.” First, the aggressor
state may violate the territorial integrity and political independence of the victim state in
an uninhabited territory. Second, the victim state may choose not to resist the intervention.
DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 132–33 (2002).
50 Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Pt. 2), art.1 (“Every internationally wrongful act of a State
entails the international responsibility of that State.”).
51 U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs . . . .” (emphasis added)).
52 TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN
CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 22 (2011) (arguing against a fixed interpretation of
“armed attack” as it was understood in 1945 when the U.N. Charter was drafted and suggesting we should look at the evolution in state practice and opinio juris in order to construe
the meaning of the concept).
45
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(I.C.J.) famously held that the gravest form of use of force is an armed attack.
The court spelled out that the criteria of “scale and effect” classify an instance
of use of force as an armed attack.53 An example of an action below the
“armed attack” threshold is funding groups within a state who aim to overthrow the government.54 Actions above the “armed attack” threshold include
crossing state borders with the army or sending armed irregulars who carry
out acts of armed force against another state.55
The concept of aggression is defined neither in the U.N. Charter nor explicitly in the practice of the I.C.J. At a minimum, aggression in international
law denotes state action in violation of the prohibition of use of force in Article 2(4).56 In an analysis of the jurisprudence of the I.C.J., Dapo Akande and
Antonios Tzanakopoulos demonstrated that the court “almost equated” the
terms “armed attack” and “aggression.”57 For example, the I.C.J. in Nicaragua58 elucidated the concept of “armed attack” by invoking Article 3(g) of the
Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly Resolution 3314
(Resolution 3314).59 In Armed Activities, the court again referred to the same
provision.60 Resolution 3314 defined the concept of “act of aggression,”
which served as the basis for defining aggression in the Rome Statute.61 Accordingly, Article 8bis(2) of the Rome Statute defines “act of aggression” as
follows:
For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter
of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless
of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:
53

Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 40, ¶ 195.
Id. ¶ 103.
55 Murphy, supra note 41, at 45.
56 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
57 Dapo Akande & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, The International Court of Justice and
the Concept of Aggression, in THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A COMMENTARY, supra note 12,
at 214, 227.
58 Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 40, ¶ 195.
59 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex (Dec. 14, 1974).
60 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities].
61 See Jan Klabbers, Intervention, Armed Intervention, Armed Attack, Threat to Peace,
Act of Aggression, and Threat or Use of Force: What’s the Difference?, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 488, 499 (Marc Weller ed.,
2015).
54
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(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of
the territory of another State, or any military occupation,
however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack,
or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State
against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the
armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea
or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has
placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that
other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a
third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.62
The exclusion of non-state actors from this definition sparked some scholarly
debate. According to Claus Kreß, this jus cogens provision has always been
understood to bind states only.63 This is empirically true, as there are no court
cases of aggression committed by non-state actors. Antonio Cassese agrees
with this point in principle but opines that the definition of the crime of aggression ought not to be restricted to state conduct only.64 According to
Cassese, if the idea of international criminal law centers around individual
criminal responsibility and the purpose of the crime of aggression is to protect
the world community from breaches of the peace, then “one fails to see why
individuals operating for non-state entities should be immune from criminal

62

ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis(1).
Claus Kreß, The State Conduct Element, in THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 412, 412.
64 Antonio Cassese, On Some Problematical Aspects of the Crime of Aggression, 20
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 841 (2007).
63
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liability for aggressive conduct.”65 Similarly, Mark Drumbl states that the intent of criminalizing aggression is to protect four interests, namely stability,
security, human rights, and sovereignty.66 He then argues that the state-centric
definition of aggression does not sufficiently protect those interests and therefore should be expanded to include, inter alia, non-state actor violence.67 Carrie McDougall, on the other hand, aligns with Kreß; she avers that the crime
of aggression is based on jus ad bellum norms and that any inclusion of nonstate actors would undermine the crime.68
Nonetheless, the Rome Statue definition confines the crime of aggression
to inter-state violence only. Whether the aggressor or the victim qualifies as a
“state” in this context is up to the ICC to decide.69 Future instances in which
non-state actors are labelled aggressors are conceivable. In any event, the
question of whether a particular act constitutes an act of aggression remains
to be determined by a court of law70 under the rules of jus ad bellum.71
Be that as it may, criminal responsibility for aggression “requires the commission of certain internationally wrongful conduct by a state.”72 As for the
reference point for individual conduct, Article 8bis(1) relies on the concept of
“an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”73 This state conduct
element—an act of aggression that manifestly violates the U.N. Charter—is a
requirement for criminal responsibility. The term used in the Nuremberg and
Tokyo tribunals was “war of aggression,”74 the precise meaning of which has
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Id. at 846.
Mark A. Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the
Gains, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 306 (2009).
67 See id. at 304–11.
68 See McDougall, supra note 46, at 109–10.
69 Kreß, supra note 63, at 422–24.
70 There was a debate during the negotiation process preceding the Kampala amendments about whether the Security Council’s determination of an act of aggression should
be a prerequisite for prosecution. However, the Special Working Group for the Crime of
Aggression decided to dispense with this requirement and focused attention on “the [International Criminal] Court’s own findings” in this respect. Any determinations by any organ
outside the Court are to be taken without prejudice to the Court’s own decision. See Stefan
Barriga, Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression, in THE TRAVAUX
PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 3, 30–31 (Claus Kreß & Stefan Barriga eds.,
2011).
71 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 35, at 316.
72 Kreß, supra note 63, at 412.
73 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis(1) (emphasis added).
74 See London Charter, supra note 9, at art. 6(a); Tokyo Charter, supra note 37, at art.
5(a).
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never been clarified.75 “War of aggression” was again introduced during the
negotiation process preceding Kampala 2010.76 However, the majority of
states favored the concept of the “act of aggression.”77 It is to be noted that an
act of aggression differs from a war of aggression in terms of gravity. Article
5(2) of Resolution 3314 states that while a war of aggression is a crime against
peace and therefore entails individual criminal responsibility, “[an act of
a]ggression only gives rise to international responsibility.”78 Therefore, not
every act of aggression constitutes a war of aggression—only the most serious
instances of the use of force.79
Even though states opted for the seemingly less stringent concept of an act
of aggression during the Kampala negotiations, the normative premise of “war
of aggression” was preserved in the Rome Statute. This was reflected in the
“Understandings” adopted by the Special Working Group for the Crime of
Aggression (SWGCA). Points 6 and 7 state the following:
6. It is understood that aggression is the most serious and
dangerous form of the illegal use of force; and that a determination whether an act of aggression has been committed
requires consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and
their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.
7. It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations, the three components of character, gravity

75 See Carrie McDougall, The Crimes Against Peace Precedent, in THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION: A COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 49, 55 & n.35 (referring to a number of
scholars who draw the same conclusion).
76 See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Ct., 2002 Coordinator’s Paper (July),
reprinted in THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 70,
at 412, § 1, Options 1–2.
77 See Claus Kreß & Leonie Von Goltzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the
Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1193 (2010).
78 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at annex art. 5(2) (Dec. 14, 1974). See also Dinstein, supra
note 46, at 114.
79 See Akande & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 57, at 218–25. The authors argue that a
“mere” use of force is at the bottom of the gravity threshold. The more serious instance of
the use of force is an act of aggression that is similar to the concept of “armed attack.”
Finally, a war of aggression is the most serious situation. Id. at 225.
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and scale must be sufficient to justify a “manifest” determination. No one component can be significant enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.80
The upshot of the negotiations was a provision in Article 8bis(1) of the Rome
Statute that a necessary condition for criminal responsibility is “an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”81 This is the state conduct element, which represents a reference point for individual conduct and therefore
an indispensable element of criminal responsibility.82 The threshold clause
has both qualitative (“manifest by its character”) and quantitative (“manifest
by its gravity and scale”) dimensions.83 Accordingly, an act of aggression as
understood in international law is insufficient to constitute individual criminal
responsibility; what is needed is a more serious form, similar to the concept
of “war of aggression.” As Fletcher shrewdly put it: “[in the eyes of the ICC]
some aggression is acceptable but not too much.”84 A clear example that satisfies both qualitative and quantitative requirements is Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine.85
To sum up, individual responsibility for the crime of aggression presupposes the existence of a completed state conduct element. When adjudicating
a claim on criminal responsibility, the court will take as reference points for
individual conduct only those state acts that amount to manifest violations of
the U.N. Charter. Further analysis of jus ad bellum is beyond the scope of this
Article.
III. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ATTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
As a reference point for individual responsibility, the state conduct element is the contextual circumstance in the actus reus paradigm that classifies
80 Rev. Conf. of the Rome Statute, ICC-RC/Res.6, annex III, Understandings Regarding the Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime
of Aggression (June 11, 2010).
81 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis(1).
82 See Hannah Lea Pfeiffer, The Crime of Aggression and the Participation Model of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 7 COLOGNE STUDIES ON
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY LAW 29 (Claus Kreß ed., 2017).
83 For an overview of the threshold clause, see Kreß, supra note 63, at 507–38.
84 2 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 23 (2020).
85 See Tom Dannenbaum, Mechanisms for Criminal Prosecution of Russia’s Aggression
Against
Ukraine,
JUST
SEC.
(Mar.
10,
2022),
https://www.justsecurity.org/80626/mechanisms-for-criminal-prosecution-of-russiasaggression-against-ukraine/.
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the perpetrator’s wrongdoing as the crime of aggression. Wrongfulness is
therefore predicated on the existence of the state conduct element. This Part
sets out the analytical framework for the account of wrongfulness and culpability for the crime of aggression that follows in the next two Parts.
Criminal responsibility is based on the violation of a prohibitory norm of
the criminal code.86 If an actor unjustifiably causes (e.g., fires a gun) an occurrence (e.g., death) that is normatively regarded as wrongdoing, he should
answer (respond) for his behavioral choice. The process of establishing a
causal (objective) link between the perpetrator’s conduct and the crime is what
we call “objective attribution.”87 This is the first step in adjudicating criminal
responsibility. The second step is determining whether such an individual is
culpable and thus can be blamed and punished.88 This process of “subjective
attribution” requires establishing subjective links between the actor and the
crime. The perpetrator that commits the wrongdoing but does not satisfy the
necessary mens rea would not be treated as a responsible agent but as a mere
“causal factor.”89
In international criminal law, objective attribution is made through the
prism of the material elements, namely, conduct, consequences, and circumstances.90 At the ICC level, the material elements are posited in either the definitions of the core crimes91 or the elements of crimes.92 Conduct describes
what the perpetrator does to bring about the consequences or criminal result.
For example, A fires a gun (conduct) and causes the death of B (consequence).
Accordingly, the conduct and consequences create a condition for the violation of the prohibitory norm.93 Most crimes incorporate the consequence element, which is a particularly relevant occurrence in space and time to which
we tie individual conduct. If conduct does not cause consequences, there is no
criminal liability.94 It follows that consequences are changes in the material
world caused by conduct.

86

See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 458 (2000).
Id. at 492.
88 In this Article, “culpability” and “blameworthiness” denote the same thing.
89 Thomas Weigend, Subjective Elements of Criminal Liability, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 490, 490 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014).
90 See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 1, § 7 (2010) [hereinafter ELEMENTS OF CRIMES].
91 ICCSt., supra note 4, at arts. 6–8bis.
92 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE 630 (2016).
93 In this case, the norm is “thou shall not kill.”
94 Cf. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 92 (2d ed. 1985).
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Exceptions to this rule are so-called “crimes of conduct”95 that do not have
harmful consequences but nonetheless incorporate in their definition a particularly relevant occurrence in space and time that marks the moment in which
the conduct is in violation of the prohibitory norm. Take, as an example,
crimes of endangerment. A prototypical example in the Rome Statute is Article 8(2)(b)(xii): declaring that no quarter will be given in an international
armed conflict.96 Suppose that military commander P issues orders to his subordinate P1 to inform the enemy that no quarter will be given a couple of days
before formal cessation of the armed conflict. P’s order does not spark any
further military operation. The message does not even get to the enemy, no
one dies or is wounded, and nothing notable happens on the battlefield. However, there is a particularly relevant occurrence to which we can tie individual
conduct. A particularly relevant change in space and time occurred in the moment when P1 heard the orders issued by P.97 This is the moment we look at
when determining whether the actor violated the prohibition in Article
8(2)(b)(xii) of the Rome Statute. It does not have to be a formal declaration;
what matters is the realization that no one will be spared.98 Precisely this moment of realization is the consequence element that causally resulted from the
conduct. The “naked” conduct—a simple declaration—is not prohibited if it
does not bring about a particularly relevant occurrence in space and time, that
is, the moment when the subordinate hears the declaration from his commander. Just now as I write I have said loudly in my home “no quarter shall
be given,” and I have not violated anything. If there is no particularly relevant
occurrence in space and time caused by a bodily movement, the individual
conduct is not in violation of the prohibitory norm.
So-called “inchoate crimes” fit the same paradigm, as by definition, they
do not render intended harm.99 Crimes of attempt are believed to be based
exclusively on the conduct element.100 How do we know what satisfies the
conduct requirement for a crime of attempt without looking at the changes in
See CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 38 (3d ed. 2013). James G. Stewart
states that the traditional understanding divides crimes into three categories: inchoate
crimes (attempt), conduct-type crimes (e.g., rape or fraud) and harm-type offences (e.g.,
murder). James G. Stewart, Overdetermined Atrocities, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1189, 1195
(2012).
96 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8(2)(b)(xii).
97 See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 90, at art. 8(2)(b)(xii) (“The perpetrator declared or ordered that there shall be no survivors.”).
98 See Michael Cottier & Julia Grignon, Article 8, Para. 2(b)(xii): Quarter, in ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE COMMENTARY
488, 490 (Kai Ambos ed., 4th ed. 2022).
99 See IRYNA MARCHUK, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS 112 (2014).
100 See 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN,
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 292 (2007).
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the material world caused by one’s action? The Rome Statute prohibits attempts to commit one of the crimes under its jurisdiction. The relevant provision reads:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that
commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but
the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the
completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment
under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that
person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.101
The prohibitory norm here amounts to: “thou shall not take a substantial step
toward committing a crime.” I assert that there is no means of classifying conduct as being in violation of the prohibitory norm for attempt except to look
at the particular occurrence in space and time caused by that conduct. For
example, shooter P tries to murder V to no avail. Bullets go astray, hitting a
tree a few meters from V. V did not hear the shooting and did not even realize
that she was the target. P’s shooting could be characterized as a violation of
many norms, e.g., unlawful shooting, unlawful possession of weapons, endangerment of public safety, etc. In order to be prosecuted for the attempted murder, the prosecution must prove that P wanted the death of V and instead hit
the tree next to her. In our example, firing a gun in V’s direction is a particularly relevant occurrence in space and time that classifies the conduct of pulling the trigger (moving a finger) as violating the prohibition on attempting to
commit murder.
In order to qualify the violation as wrongdoing, there must be a particular
situation that accompanies criminal conduct, which we refer to as the circumstance element. To this end, the perpetrator acts wrongfully if there are no
circumstances justifying his conduct. Circumstances are facts that are part of
the definition of crime.102 They may be defined as a factual or legal situation
that qualifies the violation of the prohibitory norm (conduct + consequence)

101
102

ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 25(3)(f).
See AMBOS, supra note 21, at 273.
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as being wrongful.103 An example of a factual circumstance is the victim’s
age, while the fact that a person is protected under the Geneva Conventions104
is an example of a legal (normative) circumstance. In international criminal
law, there exist so-called “contextual circumstances” that classify the wrongdoing as a specific crime.105 For example, if a murder occurs as part of a
“widespread or systematic attack” against a civilian population, then it is a
crime against humanity.106 The existence of an “attack” is a contextual circumstance.
A criminal law system would not be rational if we blamed a person for
something that he could not prevent or was not able to foresee.107 Therefore,
once we ascribe the unjustified violation of the prohibitory norm to the perpetrator, the next step is to assess whether he is blameworthy for his behavioral
choice. This appraisal is made through the prism of the mental elements that
link the perpetrator’s act to the criminal context.108 Unlike material elements,
the Rome Statute has a separate provision (Article 30) on mental elements that
applies to the core crimes as a default rule.109 The Rome Statute is the first
statute of an international tribunal to have a separate article on mens rea.110 At
other international criminal courts, the issue of mental elements was left to the
discretion of the judges.111 Article 30 of the Rome Statute refers to intent and
knowledge and is considered by some authors to be the general mens rea rule
in international criminal law.112 The reference points are the material elements: intent pertains to conduct and consequences, whereas knowledge refers to circumstances and consequences.113

103 Cf. Kevin Jon Heller, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in THE
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 593, 602 (Kevin Jon Heller & Markus Dubber eds., 2010).
104 See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8(2)(a).
105 See WERLE & JESSBERGER, supra note 31, at 174–75.
106 See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 7.
107 Weigend, supra note 89, at 490.
108 See Kai Ambos, The Crime of Aggression After Kampala, 53 GER. Y.B. INT’L L.
463, 497 (2010).
109 See 2 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 211 (2014); GeertJan Alexander Knoops, Mens Rea and the Crime of Aggression, in MENS REA AT THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 148, 155 (10 INT’L CRIM. L. SERIES 2017).
110 Sarah Finnin, Mental Elements Under Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Comparative Analysis, 61 INT’L COMPAR. L.Q. 325, 325
(2012).
111 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 292 (2006).
112 See AMBOS, supra note 21, at 266.
113 See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 30.
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Intent is a person’s wish or desire.114 According to Article 30(2)(a), a person acts with intent when he “means to engage in the conduct.”115 The existence of intent (as well as knowledge) is to be inferred from circumstances in
which the conduct took place.116 In the example above, A meant to fire the
gun by pulling the trigger. It bears stressing that an actor cannot be blamed for
“unintentional conduct such as automatic or reflex behaviour.”117 Therefore,
the notion of voluntariness is crucial for ascribing conduct to an agent. With
respect to consequences, according to Article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute, a
person can be criminally responsible and liable for punishment only if he
“means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary
course of events.”118 The meaning of the first part of this provision (“means
to cause that consequence”) is largely uncontested and is analogous to the case
with conduct—a person is to be blamed only for intentionally causing the consequence. The second part (“will occur”) implies that the consequence will
follow from the person’s conduct. In this regard, it is not sufficient that an
individual anticipates the possibility of occurrence; rather, in the moment
when he performs the conduct, he must be virtually certain119 that the criminal
result will occur in the ordinary course of events, since “after all, [the Rome
Statute] does not say ‘may occur.’”120 In this vein, “risks or possibilities” do
not satisfy the “will occur” standard,121 which is more in the domain of dolus
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Weigend, supra note 89, at 498.
ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 30(2)(a) (emphasis added).
116 Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute, §§ 137–38 (June 15, 2009) (“In the case of murder as a crime
against humanity, the intent can be inferred from the use of a firearm against unarmed
persons.”) [hereinafter Bemba].
117 SCHABAS, supra note 92, at 631.
118 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 30(2)(b).
119 Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Judgment Pursuant to Article
74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 775–76 (Mar. 7, 2014). This standard is also used before English
courts. See R v. Woollin [1999] AC 82.
120 Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, ‘Unless Otherwise Provided’: Article 30 of
the ICC Statute and the Mental Element of Crimes Under International Criminal Law, 3 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 35, 41 (2005).
121 See Donald K. Piragoff & Darryl Robinson, Article 30 Mental Element, in ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE COMMENTARY,
supra note 98, at 1328, 1338.
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eventualis.122 The required mens rea in international criminal law is dolus directus in the first or second degrees,123 while concepts like “recklessness,”
“negligence,” and “dolus eventualis” are normally not sufficient for culpability.124
The term “knowledge” in Article 30 of the Rome Statute is conflated with
“awareness.”125 Pursuant to Article 30(3), the points of reference for
“knowledge” are circumstances and consequences.126 With respect to circumstances, knowledge means awareness of the situation in which conduct takes
place.127 In relation to the consequence element, knowledge means that the
actor was aware that the consequence would occur in the ordinary course of
events as the result of his conduct.128
IV. ATTRIBUTING WRONGFULNESS OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
The immediate survey shows that the objective (actus reus) paradigm of
the structure of international crimes determines the “wrong” of the crime,
whereas the mental (mens rea) sub-structure determines whether the actor
who committed the wrongdoing is to be blamed. One way to view these facets
is by regarding the former as “conduct” elements and the latter as “fault” elements.129 In ARCA, I suggest an interpretation of the actus reus of the crime
of aggression based on Article 8bis of the Elements of Crimes,130 which reads
as follows:
Article 8 bis
122
In criminal law theory, dolus directus, dolus directus in the second degree (or dolus
indirectus), and dolus eventualis are the three manifestations of intent. In dolus directus,
the perpetrator foresees and desires the criminal outcome. In dolus indirectus, the perpetrator foresees criminal consequences as a certainty resulting from his conduct but does not
desire them. In dolus eventualis, the perpetrator does not desire consequences but foresees
the criminal outcome as a possible result of his conduct and nonetheless accepts that risk
and engages in the conduct. Johan D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court
and the Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law, 12 U. MIA. INT’L COMPAR.
L. REV. 57, 62–63 (2004). Both the common law and civil law systems developed doctrines
on different degrees of mental elements. For a comprehensive discussion of the different
degrees of mens rea, see Finnin, supra note 110.
123 Bemba, supra note 116, ¶¶ 357–69
124 See Clark, supra note 30, at 300–01, 314–15, 334.
125 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 30(3).
126 Id. (“For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 ANDREW ASHWORTH & JEREMY HORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 83 (7th ed.
2013).
130 See Hajdin, supra note 28.
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Crime of aggression
Introduction
1. It is understood that any of the acts referred to in article 8
bis, paragraph 2, qualify as an act of aggression.
2. There is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has
made a legal evaluation as to whether the use of armed force
was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The term “manifest” is an objective qualification.
4. There is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has
made a legal evaluation as to the “manifest” nature of the
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
Elements
1. The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed
an act of aggression.
2. The perpetrator was a person in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of the State which committed the act of aggression.
3. The act of aggression—the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations—was committed.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances
that established that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
5. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale,
constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations.
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances
that established such a manifest violation of the Charter of
the United Nations.131

131

ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 90, at art. 8bis (footnote omitted).
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Elements 1, 2, 3, and 5 are actus reus elements, while Elements 4 and 6 provide further directions to mens rea for the crime of aggression.132
The conduct element is constituted by the integrated conduct verbs:
“planned, prepared, initiated, or executed an act of aggression.”133 The consequence for each action is the same, namely, the use of armed force. In this
vein, the conduct verbs—planning, preparation, initiation, and execution—are
crucial stages prior to an act of aggression. Therefore, conduct is best understood as a contribution of a certain degree to one of these stages, since ordinarily there are many individuals involved in the process of carrying out the
state collective act.134 This is true for the other core crimes as well.135 Whenever there is an element of collectiveness implied in the commission of a certain act, there are at least two stages prior to action, namely, planning and
execution. The difference between the crime of aggression and the other three
core crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) is that the
latter do not explicitly contain in their definitions the stages prior to the criminal consequences.136
Element 2 is a circumstance element of the crime that denotes the leadership position of the perpetrator—a position to control or direct state action.137
The crime of aggression was always considered a leadership crime—a crime
of leaders who devise state policies.138 Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for the United States in the Nuremberg trial, stated in his opening
speech that the intention of the prosecution was not to incriminate the entire
German people but “to reach the planners and designers, the inciters and leaders without whose evil architecture the world would not have been for so long
scourged with the violence and lawlessness . . . of this terrible war.”139 He
later made it clear that during the London Conference (where the Nuremberg
Charter was adopted), the intention of the drafters was to exclude followers
from responsibility for aggression: “[i]t never occurred to me, and I am sure

132 Id. From this point on, Elements 1 to 6 will refer to the six paragraphs under ‘Elements’ of Article 8bis.
133 Id.
134 See Hajdin, supra note 28, at 493–97.
135 Furthermore, this is true for any crime that is collective in nature.
136 See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 90, at arts. 6–8.
137 For an account of who may satisfy the leadership requirement, see Nikola R. Hajdin,
Responsibility of Private Individuals for Complicity in a War of Aggression, 116 AM. J.
INT’L L. 788–97 (2022).
138 See Roger S. Clark, Negotiating Provisions Defining the Crime of Aggression, Its
Elements and the Conditions for ICC Exercise of Jurisdiction Over It, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L
1103, 1105 (2010); Akande & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 57, at 225.
139 See Robert H. Jackson, Opening Statement for the United States of America (Nov.
21, 1945), in THE CASE AGAINST THE NAZI WAR CRIMINALS 1, 13 (1946).
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it occurred to no one else at the conference table, to speak of anyone as ‘waging’ a war [of aggression] except topmost leaders who had some degree of
control over its precipitation and policy.”140
The leadership clause narrows the scope of criminal responsibility for aggression. This is highly reasonable from a criminal law perspective. First and
foremost, states are run by leaders and their followers, and expecting everyone
to be accountable for state actions runs the risk of over-criminalization.141
Thus, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal held that there must be a standard for
criminal responsibility, a threshold of sorts for wars of aggression that differentiates the guilty from the innocent and prevents collective guilt and mass
punishment.142 Consequently, the leadership clause was introduced as a tool
to limit the scope of criminal responsibility, and since the post-WWII trials, it
has been generally accepted that only high-ranking state agents can be held
responsible for the crime of aggression.143 Another reason for leadership responsibility lies in the nature of the norms violated in the crime of aggression.
The crime of aggression is, inter alia, a violation of jus ad bellum—something
that is said not to be carried out by soldiers or even lower-ranking state officers.144 Only state leaders are typically aware that state policies, which are
products of their own doing, are illegal, and therefore, it would be unfair to
hold followers responsible for something they did not have knowledge of. An
admiral who gives orders for an unlawful attack certainly knows much more
than the regular soldiers who carry out that attack. Moreover, the actions of
leaders and followers are normatively distinct, and since the latter are in no
position to decisively influence state policy on the use of force, they should
not be blamed for the crime of aggression.145
The main contribution of ARCA is the classification of the state collective
act. During the travaux préparatoires, it was not clear whether Elements 3
and 5, which describe the state collective act, refer to the consequence or circumstance element.146 The drafters highlighted the practical issue of characterizing Elements 3 and 5 as consequences, as the required mental element
140 Robert H. Jackson, The United Nations Organization and War Crimes, 46 PROC.
AMER. SOC’Y INT’L L. 196, 198 (1952).
141 See NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL: A REAPPRAISAL 151–52 (2008).
142 United States v. Krauch, Opinion and Judgment of the United States Military Tribunal VI, in 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 1126 (1952).
143 Matthew Gillett, The Anatomy of an International Crime: Aggression at the International Criminal Court, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 829, 860 (2013).
144 See LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 16 (2008).
145 Dannenbaum, supra note 25, at 867.
146 2009 Montreux Draft Elements of Crimes, reprinted in THE TRAVAUX
PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 70, at 671. Proposed Elements
3 and 5 can be characterized as either circumstances (in which the perpetrator’s conduct
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might be difficult to prove. Namely, Article 30 of the Rome Statute stipulates
intent and knowledge in relation to consequences in that the perpetrator either
meant to cause the consequence or was aware that a certain consequence
would occur in the ordinary course of events.147 If Elements 3 and 5 are understood in this way, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew that
the collective act was both inconsistent with the U.N. Charter and represented
a manifest violation, which may, for instance, allow the perpetrator to shield
his responsibility behind disreputable legal advice.148 Consequently, the act of
aggression was regarded as a circumstance element, without defining the consequence element.149 The consequence element of the crime of aggression—
the result of the perpetrator’s conduct—is the state’s use of armed force that
forms the basis for a normative determination of the existence of an act of
aggression within the meaning of Article 8bis of the Rome Statute (Element
3). In ARCA, I use the term “material act of use of violence” to account for
the consequence element for the crime of aggression.150 Following discussions with Thomas Weigend, I have modified my position and now suggest
“use of armed force” as a more suitable terminology for the consequence element. In essence, the argument remains unaffected: by actively engaging in
conduct, the perpetrator causes the state’s violent use of armed force against
another state. As explained in ARCA, this act of inter-state violence is a deliberate exercise of force or intimidation by one state against another.151 Moreover, the use of armed force always implies a physical effect as a manifestation
of state action.152 Consequently, the use of violence is built into the notion of
use of armed force.153 Nonetheless, Weigend was right to point out that the
more adequate term to capture the consequence element would be “use of
armed force” since this wording is employed in both Article 8bis of the Rome
Statute and Element 3 of the Elements of Crimes.154
takes place) or consequences (a result of the perpetrator’s conduct), or both, therefore the
application of Article 30’s default mental elements is unclear. Accordingly, a policy choice
about the correct characterization of proposed elements 3 and 5 and the corresponding
mental attitude of the perpetrator is required.
147 ICCSt, supra note 4, at art. 30.
148 See 2009 Montreux Draft Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, at 671.
149 Id.
150 See Hajdin, supra note 28, at 502.
151 See id. at 504.
152 Article 8bis(2) of the Rome Statute requires the “use of armed force.” This excludes
non-violent actions, such as threats of use of force or economic coercions. See ICCSt.,
supra note 4, at art. 8bis(2) (emphasis added).
153 Unlike the threat of force, the use of force always presupposes violence. See James
A. Green & Francis Grimal, The Threat of Force as an Action in Self-Defense Under International Law, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 285, 311 (2011).
154 See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis; ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 90, at art.
8bis, Element 3.
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The contextual circumstance that qualifies the individual conduct as
wrongful is the existence of an act of aggression that manifestly violates the
U.N. Charter, that is, the state conduct element (Element 5). In effect, this
means that causing the state’s use of armed force is wrongful only if it constitutes “an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”155 This normative characterization of “whether a particular situation constitutes the
[contextual] circumstances of the crime of aggression is left entirely to the
court of law.”156
This is a correct reading of the material elements of the crime of aggression
that solves much of the conceptual dilemma the drafters faced during the negotiations preceding Kampala 2010. In practical terms, to ascribe wrongfulness to the perpetrator of the crime of aggression, the prosecution need not
necessarily prove that he is accountable for the entire state aggression. His
conduct is wrongful if he causes the use of armed force that either constitutes
in and of itself, or is part of a series of state actions that, taken as a whole,
amount to the state conduct element.
V. ATTRIBUTING CULPABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
To ascribe individual responsibility for the crime of aggression, the prosecution must prove the wrongfulness of the perpetrator’s conduct as well as
the necessary mens rea in the moment when he acted.157 We assess the culpability of the perpetrator based on mental elements. Pursuant to Article 30(1)
of the Rome Statute,158 if a definition of the crime or a mode of criminal responsibility does not specify mens rea, the default mental elements apply.159
Accordingly, as stated in Part II above, intent refers to conduct and consequences, while knowledge is related to consequences and circumstances. In
the Elements of Crimes,160 there are two provisions that provide further directions on the mens rea for the crime of aggression: Element 4, which requires
that “[t]he perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established
that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations” and Element 6, which requires that “[t]he perpetrator was aware of
the factual circumstances that established such a manifest violation of the
155

See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis(1).
See Hajdin, supra note 28, at 499.
157 The moment the perpetrator acts is the moment to be examined when assessing the
required mens rea.
158 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 30(1) (“unless otherwise provided”).
159 See Piragoff & Robinson, supra note 121, at 1118.
160 According to Article 9 of the Rome Statute., the Elements of Crimes shall assist the
ICC in the interpretation of the definition of the crimes and shall be consistent with the text
of the Rome Statute. See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 9.
156
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Charter of the United Nations.”161 They refer to the consequence and circumstance requirements, respectively, and will be analyzed in the remainder of
this Article.
A. Conduct
Article 30(2) of the Rome Statute requires that a person must mean to engage in her conduct.162 The notion of voluntariness is crucial for ascribing
conduct to an agent, and the person to whom the conduct is ascribed has to
have the capacity to act freely.163 Conversely, conduct that emanates from
non-volition is beyond the scope of criminal responsibility. A person cannot
be blamed for “unintentional conduct such as automatic or reflex behaviour.”164 Therefore, conduct may be either voluntary or involuntary; only the
former entails attribution of culpability to the actor.165 Element 1 defines conduct as planning, preparation, initiation, or execution.166 These are the crucial
stages prior to an act of aggression. As Weisbord asserts, “[p]lanning, preparing, initiating, or executing is to the crime of aggression what pulling the trigger of a gun is to murder.”167 Consequently, the prosecution must prove that
the accused was voluntarily engaged in the complex action of the planning,
preparation, initiation, or execution of the use of armed force.168
B. Consequence
In order to prove that the actor violated the prohibitory norm of the criminal code, we look at certain changes in the material world and argue that the

161

See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 90, at art. 8bis.
ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 30(2).
163 H.L.A. Hart adds a notion of “fair opportunity” to perform such capacity in a way
other than someone else did. He proposes that it would be morally wrong to punish someone for a criminal act if the person did not have normal capacities and a fair opportunity to
act accordingly. He states that “[w]here these capacities and opportunities are absent, as
they are in different ways in the varied cases of accident, mistake, paralysis, reflex action,
coercion, insanity, etc., the moral protest is that it is morally wrong to punish because ‘he
could not have helped it’ or ‘he could not have done otherwise’ or ‘he had no real choice’.”
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 152
(2d ed. 2008).
164 SCHABAS, supra note 92, at 631.
165 See Piragoff & Robinson, supra note 121, at 1121.
166 See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 90, at art. 8bis, Element 1.
167 Noah Weisbord, The Mens Rea of the Crime of Aggression, 12 WASH. UNIV. GLOB.
STUD. L. REV. 487, 492 (2013).
168 This is largely uncontested in the scholarship. See Clark, supra note 138, at 1112.
162
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actor voluntarily caused such a result.169 The criminal consequence is a particularly relevant occurrence in space and time that marks the end of the complex action causing the criminal result. The beginning of that action is a willed
bodily movement that we refer to as conduct.170 Consequently, conduct and
consequence create the condition in which the violation of the prohibitory
norm exists.171
The consequence of the crime of aggression is described in Element 3 (“the
use of armed force”).172 Element 4 provides for the corresponding mens rea
stipulating that the perpetrator must be aware of the factual circumstances that
establish inconsistency of the use of armed force with the U.N. Charter.173
Element 4, however, does not account for the actual existence (material manifestation) of consequences of the crime of aggression. Therefore, a default
rule enshrined in Article 30 of the Rome Statute applies.174 Accordingly, to
satisfy the required mens rea, the perpetrator must intend (“mean to cause”)
the use of armed force or must be aware that the use of armed force will occur
in the ordinary course of events as a result of his conduct.175 Crucially, the
mens rea does not require the offender to make a legal evaluation of whether
the collective act he causes is inconsistent with the U.N. Charter;176 he simply
intends a forceful state action against another state or is aware that it will
occur because of his engagement in one of the crucial stages prior to state
action. Whether such state action would be eventually regarded as the use of
armed force is subject to a normative evaluation and therefore irrelevant for
subjective attribution.
It bears stressing that the mens rea standard was higher during the postWWII trials, as the tribunals required actual knowledge of the existence of the
state’s aggressive war.177 During the negotiations preceding Kampala 2010,
the Chairman of the Special Working Group for the Crime of Aggression identified problems with such an approach that, if read in its essence, required

169 This proposition follows the rule that no one should be responsible for something
that they did not cause. See JEREMY HORDER, ASHWORTH’S PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
118 (8th ed. 2016).
170 In criminal theory, the dominant view of what makes human action is propounded
by the mechanistic conception as “a willed bodily movement.” See MICHAEL S. MOORE,
ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW
39 (2010).
171 See Hajdin, supra note 27, at 72.
172 See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 90, at art. 8bis, Element 3.
173 Id. at Element 4.
174 See Ambos, supra note 108, at 497.
175 See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 30(2)(b).
176 See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 90, at art. 8bis, intro. § 2.
177 See McDougall, supra note 46, at 195–96.
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knowledge of the law.178 This would enable the perpetrator to shield himself
from responsibility by relying on disreputable legal advice. For example, the
President of State A could use a handsome commission to nudge a prominent
international legal expert to provide an opinion that strongly argues in favor
of the legality of State A’s premeditated actions against State B. The Chairman
thus proposed that instead of “knowledge of law,” it is appropriate to have
“knowledge of factual circumstances” showing the inconsistency of the state
act with the U.N. Charter. The Chairman stated the following:
To satisfy proposed Element 4, it would not be sufficient
merely to show that the perpetrator knew of facts indicating
that the State used armed force. It would also be necessary
to show that the perpetrator knew of acts establishing the inconsistency of the use of force with the Charter of the United
Nations. Examples of relevant facts here could include: the
fact that the use of force was directed against another State,
the existence or absence of a Security Council resolution, the
content of a Security Council resolution, the existence or absence of a prior or imminent attack by another State.179
Accordingly, the required awareness element is based on the perpetrator’s
knowledge of the existing facts—Security Council resolutions, the existence
or absence of an imminent attack, etc.— that may indicate a violation of the
U.N. Charter. Unlike before the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, this standard
of knowledge ought not to be difficult to establish. As a rule, use of force is
proscribed by international law,180 and only on an exceptional basis is it permissible to resort to inter-state violence.181 Consequently, anyone accountable
for causing the use of armed force should be presumed to have had factual

178 2009 Chairman’s Non-Paper on the Elements of Crimes, reprinted in THE TRAVAUX
PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 70, at 682 [hereinafter 2009
Chairman’s Non-Paper].
179 Id. at 683.
180 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
181 There are two well-established exceptions to the prohibition of use of force in international law: the right to self-defense, id. at art. 51, and the use of force authorized by
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. See RUCHI ANAND,
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 60 (2009). A state that uses force may also
invoke consent to preclude wrongfulness of her action within the limits of that consent.
Int’l L. Comm’n, supra note 50, at art. 20 (“Valid consent by a State to the commission of
a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former
State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.”). On this point,
see also Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy,
54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 10 (2013) (“[A] state may invoke consent after the fact to justify
violating an international agreement.”).
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knowledge of the illegality of his actions,182 particularly given the high-level
position of the perpetrator in the state’s hierarchical structure of governance.183
A backwards glance is now in order. Every act of aggression is based on a
material manifestation (physical effect) captured by the term “use of armed
force.” The physical manifestation is a particularly relevant occurrence in
space and time to which the perpetrator’s conduct is causally related. To this
end, the use of armed force is to be understood in its naturalistic meaning—
as a violent action against another state.184 If the perpetrator not only intends
forceful state action (such as “bombardment”)185 or is aware this event will
occur as the result of his conduct but also is cognizant of all the relevant factual circumstances that establish that such an occurrence will violate the U.N.
Charter, he satisfies the mens rea requirement for the consequence element of
the crime of aggression. Whether such violation of the prohibitory norm (conduct + consequence) is wrongful or justified from a criminal law perspective,
that is, whether the accused committed the crime of aggression by causing the
use of armed force to occur, is to be determined in the circumstances paradigm. The following Section gives an account of this matter.
C. Circumstances
The circumstances of the crime of aggression are enshrined in Elements 2
and 5. Element 2 prescribes the leadership clause to which the default provision on mens rea applies.186 Accordingly, pursuant to Article 30(2) of the
Rome Statute, the perpetrator must be aware that he was in a position effectively to exercise control over or direct the political or military action of the
state.187

182 The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal held that in cases of inter-state violence, the perpetrator “must know that he is doing wrong.” 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 462. According to the socalled de minimis approach, even limited violent state action such as small-scale territorial
incursions by armed units would amount to the use of armed force inconsistent with the
U.N. Charter. See Ruys, supra note 45, at 189.
183 Only the top-tier leaders of the state who control the policies on use of force may
be prosecuted for the crime of aggression. See Hajdin, supra note 27, at 131–33.
184 The use of violence is built on the notion of the use of armed force. See Green &
Grimal, supra note 153, at 311.
185 See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis(2)(b).
186 Roger S. Clark, Individual Conduct, in THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 565 (explaining that the default mental element requires
that the perpetrator is aware that he obtained such a position during his engagement in state
action). See also 2009 Chairman’s Non-Paper, supra note 178, at 681.
187 I discuss the leadership requirement elsewhere. See Hajdin, supra note 27, at 101–
34.
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Element 5 refers to an act of aggression that “by its character, gravity and
scale” manifestly violates the U.N. Charter.188 This so-called state conduct
element is the contextual circumstance that qualifies the violation of the prohibitory norm—causing the use of armed force—as wrongful and classifies
the individual conduct as the crime of aggression.189 As stated in Part II above,
only those instances of causing the use of armed force that are classified as
the state conduct element—a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter—are
criminalized under Article 8bis of the Rome Statute.190
The required mens rea for the contextual circumstances is specified in Element 6: the perpetrator needs to be “aware of the factual circumstances that
established” the state conduct element.191 By the same token, as the mens rea
for the consequence element, Element 6 read in conjunction with paragraph 4
of the Introduction to Article 8bis of the Elements of Crimes requires only that
the perpetrator has knowledge of the factual circumstances that established a
manifest violation of the U.N. Charter. Thus, “[w]ords, actions, the minutes
of meetings attended, the armaments used in an attack,”192 the existence of the
state policy to commit aggression, and the perpetrator’s actions in furtherance
of such policy193 are all relevant factors that may inform the mens rea of the
accused in relation to the state conduct element.
In some cases, the perpetrator is aware that the act of use of force he causes
would not satisfy the state conduct element; for example, the accused may
know that inducing only a small-scale border skirmish would not amount to a
manifest violation of the U.N. Charter.194 In the situation where a larger military action ensues (amounting to a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter),
without the knowledge or participation of the perpetrator, he would not be
responsible, as he lacks the required mental element pertaining to the contextual circumstances.195 Thus, the perpetrator is responsible only if he is aware

188

See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 90, at art. 8bis, Element 5.
See Hajdin, supra note 28, at 498–99.
190 See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 8bis(1).
191 See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 90, at art. 8bis, Element 6.
192 Weisbord, supra note 167, at 498.
193 The International Law Commission held that the perpetrator needs to be aware that
her conduct is part of an existing plan or policy of aggression. “The mere material fact of
participating in an act of aggression is, however, not enough to establish the guilt of a leader
or organizer. Such participation must have been intentional and have taken place knowingly as part of a plan or policy of aggression.” 1996 International Law Commission Draft
Code of Crimes, with Commentary (Excerpts), reprinted in THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES
OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 70, at 198.
194 Weisbord, supra note 167, at 497.
195 See Frances Anggadi et al., Negotiating the Elements of the Crime of Aggression,
in THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 70, at 76.
189
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of the factual circumstances according to which the result of his actions constitutes the use of force of a certain character, gravity, and scale sufficient to
lead to a finding that the U.N. Charter has been manifestly violated.
The excess situation should be clearly distinguished from a case where the
perpetrator is aware that the state action for which he is accountable for in and
of itself will not reach the threshold of Article 8bis(1) of the Rome Statute but
is part of broader hostilities that, taken as a whole, amount to the state conduct
element.196 Herein lies the crucial importance of distinguishing the consequence element from the contextual circumstances of the crime of aggression.
As I explained in ARCA, an act of aggression in the ordinary course of events
consists of a series of collective state actions.197 Not all such actions, partially
taken, would normally amount to the state conduct element. As wrongfulness
is predisposed on causing criminal consequences, to incur criminal responsibility the perpetrator needs to be accountable only for a single instance of the
“mere” use of armed force not necessarily in and of itself amounting to the
state conduct element. It suffices if the perpetrator is aware of the factual circumstances according to which the use of armed force is part of a series of
state actions that, taken as a whole, constitute the state conduct element. For
example, State A invades State B. The invasion consists of several attacks on
the territory of State B. After several days, the invasion is complete, and State
A installs a new government in State B. During the inter-state violence, there
was no serious loss of human life. Even the property of State B remained almost intact. For the sake of argument, let us assume that State A committed
an act of aggression in terms of Article 8bis of the Rome Statute.198 However,
each of the attacks taken separately from the whole invasion would not meet
the threshold of Article 8bis(1). To make it even more interesting, none of the
individual attacks constitutes an act of aggression but is rather a “mere” violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. In the case at hand, offenders responsible for wrongdoings—i.e., individuals who caused separate attacks and
satisfied the leadership clause (political leaders, military generals, etc.)—are
culpable if the prosecution proves they were aware that the state action they
caused was part of a series of state actions that together may be classified as
the state conduct element.
The conceptual distinction between consequences and circumstances allows for such an interpretation. The prosecution must prove that the accused
196

See Armed Activities, supra note 60, ¶¶ 149–53. The International Court of Justice
found that Uganda conducted a series of acts of armed violence against the DRC and therefore violated its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The series of military interventions
were classified as “a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force” due to their
magnitude and duration. Id. ¶ 165.
197 See Hajdin, supra note 28, at 500.
198 Whether such a case would be eventually regarded as a manifest violation of the
U.N. Charter is subject to the “scale” and “gravity” tests. See Kreß, supra note 12, at 523.
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caused the consequence (use of armed force in violation of the U.N. Charter).
According to the de minimis approach,199 even a limited forceful state action
would satisfy the consequence requirement and may entail criminal responsibility even though it does not itself constitute the state conduct element.200
However, the actor need not have a causal relationship with the contextual
circumstances (state conduct element); he only has to be mindful of the state
of affairs in which his actions take place.201 Roger Clark explains this relationship vividly:
It is easy enough to think of “committing” conduct (including
conduct by omission), or even of “committing” a consequence,
such as a homicide. It is, on the other hand, difficult to think of
“committing” a circumstance. It is not my action that makes
something the property of another. That is part of the scene (a
crucial part) against which I engage in conduct in taking someone else’s stuff. I do have an attitude towards it, though, probably “knowledge”. Hence, “committed” must be interpreted as
meaning something like “accompanied by” in order to make
sense in relation to circumstance elements.202
Indeed, it sounds more plausible to refer to a state of affairs as “accompanying” conduct rather than “committing.” Certainly, human actions create circumstances. However, in the actus reus trichotomy, the perpetrator has only a

199

See supra Part II.
An analogous argument may be found in an example of murder as a crime against
humanity. According to ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 7, causing (conduct) death (consequence) represents the violation of the prohibitory norm of the criminal code, while the
existence of a widespread or systematic attack is the contextual circumstance that classifies
such a violation as a crime against humanity. Accordingly, an act of murder may be classified as a crime against humanity if it constitutes in and of itself or is part of a widespread
or systematic attack. See Kai Ambos, Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity, in ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE COMMENTARY,
supra note 98, at 135, 156 (arguing that a single act of murder may constitute the attack
itself). In Tadić, on the other hand, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia spelled out that “a single act by a perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual perpetrator need not commit numerous offences to be held liable.”
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 649 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). Therefore, an isolated act of the use of armed
force that would not in itself constitute a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter may entail
criminal responsibility if it is part of a series of collective acts that together constitute the
state conduct element.
201 ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 30(3).
202 See Clark, supra note 30, at 307 n.54.
200
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subjective (mental) connection with circumstances, and by no means is he accountable for their existence. Therefore, in a case of the crime of aggression,
the perpetrator must be aware of the factual circumstances according to which
the result of his actions either constitutes in and of itself or contribute to an
overarching act of aggression that manifestly violates the U.N. Charter.
Another case that differs from the excess situation pertains to the temporal
aspect of jus ad bellum. For example, State A initiates an armed attack against
State B. State B invokes the right to self-defense pursuant to U.N. Charter
Article 51. During the protracted hostilities, both states carry out several acts
of use of armed force against each other. At some point, one of the states
carries out an action that would ordinarily be considered a manifest violation
of the U.N. Charter. The issue at stake is whether only State A’s initial attack
may constitute a violation of jus ad bellum or whether any other subsequent
act of inter-state violence may be regarded as such. The answer depends on
whether the norms of jus ad bellum continue to apply during the protracted
armed violence or are replaced by some other norms (e.g., jus in bello).203
In the past, the view was that jus ad bellum applies only to the initial use
of force, while jus in bello applies thereafter.204 If the norms of jus ad bellum
cease to apply after the initial attack, then individual criminal responsibility
for aggression is constrained to that particular action.205 However, the current
dominant view in both scholarship206 and state practice207 is that jus ad bellum
norms continue to apply after the initial attack. Thus, Murphy, Kidane and
Snider state the following:
203 The norms of jus ad bellum are conventionally understood as the basis for the justified transition from peace to war, whereby jus in bello defines conduct and responsibilities of the belligerents during the state of war. See Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus ad Bellum’, ‘Jus in
Bello’ . . . ‘Jus post Bellum’?–Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force, 17
EUR. J. INT’L L. 921, 926 (2007).
204 Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 963, 968 (2008).
205 For arguments for constrained temporal application of jus ad bellum, see Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in Warfare against
Nonstate Actors, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 541, 546–47 (2009); Michael Bothe, Terrorism and
the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 227, 234 (2003).
206 See Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in
Bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221, 223 (1983) (“[M]odern jus ad bellum applies not only to
the act of commencing hostilities but also to each act involving the use of force which
occurs during the course of hostilities.”); Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War,
34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 68 (2009); Moussa, supra note 204, at 968; Eliav Lieblich, On the
Continuous and Concurrent Application of ad Bellum and in Bello Proportionality, in
NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY LAW 41, 73,
75 (Claus Kreß & Robert Lawless eds., 2020).
207 See Ethiopia v. Eritrea, Partial Award: Jus Ad Bellum – Ethiopia’s Claims 1–8, 26
R.I.A.A. 457, 467, 469 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005).
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The Article 2(4) prohibition is not narrowly crafted to the
sanctioning of the initiation of a war; it precludes a state not
just from using force to attack another state, but from using
further force to prevent the other state from exercising its
inherent right of self-defense to which it is entitled under international law. Preventing a state from defending itself,
whether those defensive actions were anticipated or not by
the aggressor, is a use of force against the territorial integrity
and political independence of a state just as much as an initial invasion of that state. The conditions for engaging in
self-defense under UN Charter Article 51, especially the restrictions on proportionality and necessity, are understood as
operating throughout the course of the armed conflict; if a
defending state undertakes action that is not necessary or
proportionate, it engages in its own unlawful use of force in
violation of Article 2(4). Similarly, whatever actions an aggressor takes that serve to maintain, preserve, or extend its
aggression are all part of the jus ad bellum violation.208
Both arguments are equally plausible, at least in logical terms,209 and it is unclear which path the ICC will eventually take. The choice is immaterial for
proving mens rea regarding the existence of contextual circumstances since
this is a matter that ought to be solved in the domain of factual circumstances.210 If the ICC restricts the application of jus ad bellum, the better for
the accused. However, if it opts for the continuous application of jus ad bellum, which will likely be the case, an actor suspected to have caused the illegal
use of armed force during protracted armed violence amounting to the state
conduct element could not invoke the defense of mistake of law by claiming
that he believed the ICC would make a different assessment on the application
of jus ad bellum.211
208 SEAN D. MURPHY ET AL., LITIGATING WAR: ARBITRATION OF CIVIL INJURY BY THE
ERITREA-ETHIOPIA CLAIMS COMMISSION 119 (2013).
209 Every argument, irrespective of how persuasive it seems, has an equally compelling
counterargument stemming from the same premise. Therefore, at least from the logical
perspective, there is no difference between the two. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Last
Treatise: Project and Person (Reflections on Martti Koskenniemi’s “From Apology to Utopia”), 7 GER. L.J. 982, 989 (2006).
210 See ELEMENT OF CRIMES, supra note 90, art. 8bis, intro. ¶ 3.
211 See ICCSt., supra note 4, at art. 32(2). Roger S. Clark, a member of the Samoan
delegation both in Rome and during the Kampala Conference, makes a good point regarding cases where the defense of mistake of law actually works:
It is no defense to a bigamy charge to insist on a belief that having two
or more spouses is legal, but there must be a defense for the actor who
believes that the previous marriage had terminated in divorce, even if
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To sum up, the ICC’s normative assessment of whether a particular act
constitutes a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter is immaterial for establishing mental links between the perpetrator and the state conduct element.
The offender need only be aware of the factual circumstances that ultimately
lay the grounds for the normative determination and not of the illegality itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
Collective in nature, state aggression is a product of many individuals who
participate in a joint endeavor. According to Article 8bis(1) of the Rome Statute, there are four crucial stages prior to an act of aggression—planning, preparation, initiation, and execution—to which individuals contribute to varying
degrees. To ascribe wrongfulness to the crime of aggression, the prosecution
must prove that the accused was engaged in at least one of those complex
actions and that he caused the material act of the use of armed force. Wrongfulness is a violation of the prohibitory norm without justification, and in some
instances, the actor’s conduct may be justified, like when acting to help his
state in self-defense. What ultimately qualifies the perpetrator’s conduct as
wrongful is the qualification of the state act of use of force he caused as either
constituting in and of itself or contributing to an act of aggression that manifestly violates the U.N. Charter.
Finally, to blame the wrongdoer, a mental link between the perpetrator and
the crime must be established. In effect, the prosecution must prove that the
offender voluntarily engaged in the planning, preparation, initiation, or execution of state action and intended or was aware of the factual circumstances
according to which the use of armed force in contravention of the U.N. Charter
would take place as a result of his conduct. In addition, the perpetrator needs
to be aware of the factual circumstances establishing that i) such a use of
armed force either constitutes in and of itself or contributes to an overarching
act of aggression that manifestly violates the U.N. Charter and ii) he can “control or direct” state action. If all these conditions are met and there exists no

this involved some mistake as to the law relating to divorce. The typical case where the defense “works” is where the element in question .
. . is what the Rome Statute would call a “circumstance” element. A
mistake of law that works is typically about some law that is collateral
to the central criminal proscription.
Roger S. Clark, Drafting a General Part to a Penal Code: Some Thoughts Inspired by the
Negotiations on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and by the Court’s
First Substantive Law Discussion in the Lubanga Dyilo Confirmation Proceedings, 19
CRIM. L.F. 519, 536 (2008). This is clearly different from the case where the perpetrator is
taking a risk by choosing to believe that the ICC will make a normative determination that
will serve him.
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excuse, the perpetrator is blameworthy for the wrongdoing and thus liable for
punishment.

